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I INTRODUCTION
Mark Twain once wrote an essay about the diffi   culties of learning 
what he called “Th   e Awful German Language.”1 Similar barriers 
to comprehension seem to plague those trying to explain recent 
German economic performance. By most measures, Germany 
has the best functioning labor market among large economies 
in the West, with levels of employment reaching those in the 
United States at the end of the turbo-charged 1990s. A debate 
has stirred, however, about whether this success has come with 
a price—specifi   cally, whether Germany’s domestic structural 
reforms have lowered living standards for Germany’s low-
income workers and worsened income inequality and whether 
Germany is fortuitously and perhaps selfi  shly riding a wave of 
strong foreign demand for German exports.
Th  is Policy Brief aims to show how Germany’s recent 
labor market success—its low unemployment rate, high labor 
participation rate, and increased productivity—has indeed 
1. Twain (1880, appendix D, 299–312).
resulted from the country’s comprehensive structural reform 
of its labor market in the early 2000s. Moreover, Germany’s 
successful record suggests that other euro area economies 
can yield large economic and social benefi   ts from such 
adjustments without worsening the trend toward income 
inequality that many Europeans deplore and fear. Th  ere has 
been German wage restraint, but the evidence shows that such 
restraint has played a lesser role than widely assumed, while 
the expansion of low-wage “mini-jobs”—much criticized for 
allegedly squeezing the low-wage workforce—can largely be 
explained by evidence that they are used increasingly as second 
jobs. Germany thus proves that higher employment, increased 
labor force participation, and improved productivity can be 
achieved at no additional rise in inequality.
I lay out my argument in four sections. Section II pres-
ents the evidence of Germany’s labor market performance 
relative to its large industrialized peers. Section III surveys the 
nature of Germany’s labor market reforms. Section IV focuses 
specifi  cally on the changes made to the low-wage part of the 
German labor market and highlights that so-called mini-
jobs in Germany have expanded primarily because German 
workers have increasingly held them as second jobs (neben-
jobs). Section V concludes that despite this record of success, 
Germany can and should do more to improve the options for 
German women to work full time and avoid a two-tiered labor 
market that favors people with secure jobs over those outside 
the productive labor force. Achieving that goal will involve 
additional expenditures of public resources to help workers 
upgrade their skills.
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II THE HIGH-PRESSURE GERMAN LABOR 
MARKET OF THE 2000s2
Germany’s labor market performance and job levels since 2005 
rival those of the United States in the dot-com expansion of 
the late 1990s, a feat all the more impressive considering that 
Germany has not had the economic steroids of real estate or asset 
bubbles. For example, Germany has enjoyed record employ-
ment-population ratios of over 73 percent since 2005, eclipsing 
the traditionally more fl   exible labor markets in the United 
States and United Kingdom (fi  gure 1).3 Th  e contrast with the 
United States is striking, because US employment rates were 10 
percentage points higher than in Germany during the 1990s but 
are now lower by 5 to 6 percentage points. In the euro area, 
German job creation contrasts with the stagnation in France 
and recent recessionary declines in Italy and Spain. In terms of 
labor force participation (fi  gure 2), Germany has outperformed 
comparable large industrialized countries since 2005.
Such large-scale changes in the employment and labor 
force participation ratios rarely get discussed when the 
more publicized unemployment data are released. Th  ey 
matter greatly, however. Germany’s working age labor force 
participation ratio has increased by 4 percentage points 
since 2005, while its unemployment rate today is around 6 
percent. In other words, all other things being equal, without 
these increases in labor force participation rates, Germany’s 
unemployment rate today would hypothetically be around 2 
percent, well below normal full employment levels. Th  e  situ-
ation in the United States is the reverse. With a working age 
employed population of about 137 million,4 the estimated 
4 percentage points decline in the working age employment 
ratio since 2005 translates5 into more than 5 million “missing 
jobs” today, had the US employment ratio stayed constant 
since 2005. Adding this number to the recorded number of 
US unemployed yields around 17 million missing jobs, well 
above the peak levels in early 2010.
German employment growth after 2005 has also been 
remarkably broad-based across gender and age groups, as illus-
2. In 1999, Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger wrote a paper titled Th  e 
High-Pressure U.S. Labor Market of the 1990s describing the extraordinary 
performance of the US labor market in the 1990s.
3. All tables and fi  gures appear at the end of the Policy Brief.
4. Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey household 
data.
5. Employment ratios are estimated with the total working age population in 
the denominator, whereas unemployment rates are calculated as percentages of 
the (smaller denominator) labor force. As such, the percentage point changes 
cannot be directly compared but relatively understate the implied increase in 
the current recorded US unemployment rate at an assumed constant 2005 
employment ratio.
trated in fi  gure 3. Only teenaged men in Germany are today 
marginally less likely to be employed than in 2005, while 
employment among older Germans has dramatically increased 
in recent years. A fi  fth of all 6  0-to-64-year-olds (more than 20 
percent in fi  gure 3) have become employed since 2005. As I 
discuss later, this distribution of German employment gains 
results from Germany’s labor market overhaul of the mid-
2000s, and it alleviates the problems of its aging population. 
Th   e overall ability of the German labor market to match 
the unemployed with fi  rms looking for new workers (matching 
effi     ciency) has also improved since 2005, as illustrated in 
the Beveridge curve (fi  gure 4), which combines data on the 
number of unemployed with the number of fi  rms looking for 
workers. An improving Beveridge curve moves in the lower 
left direction over the course of the business cycle to lower 
unemployment levels and fewer fi  rms looking for workers.
Figure 4 shows how the German Beveridge curve has devel-
oped dramatically since 1995. In the pre-euro era until 1999, the 
German labor market changed little in matching effi   ciency, while 
from the introduction of the euro in 1999 to 2005 the German 
labor market deteriorated as the Beveridge curve moved to the 
lower right. Since 2005, however, the change in labor market 
matching effi   ciency over the business cycles has been positive 
and toward the left, as German unemployment fell, while fewer 
fi  rms looked for workers. Something evidently changed in the 
functioning of the German labor market after 2005.
Moreover, the increase in German labor utilization 
since 2005 has taken place without sacrifi  cing  aggregate 
Germany productivity levels, as presumably less productive 
workers entered the economy. Figure 5 shows how broad 
German labor force utilization (hours worked per capita) fell 
from reunifi  cation in 1991 during the deutsche mark years 
until 1999 and in the early euro era to 2005. In this period, 
productivity rose (real GDP per hour worked). From 2005 to 
2012 both German labor force utilization and productivity 
rose, however, in contrast with the time trends in other large 
European economies and the United States.6 
III ANALYZING THE LABOR MARKET REFORMS 
OF GERHARD SCHRÖDER 
One of the ironies of recent German political history is the fact 
that the all-embracing scope of German labor market reforms, 
which have yielded considerable successes in recent years, 
were undertaken by the government of Gerhard Schröder, 
who led Germany as chancellor from 1998 to 2005, when 
6. Low German annual hours worked and—as will be elaborated below—in-
creasing part-time work keep German hours per capita below US and UK 
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his Social Democratic Party was defeated in national elections 
by the Christian Democrats of Angela Merkel. His record is 
often underappreciated, or remembered principally by the 
politically contentious Hartz IV reforms—named after Peter 
Hartz,7 who headed a reform commission in that period—
which reduced long-term unemployment benefi  ts. Germany’s 
reforms were in fact far more comprehensive and complicated, 
though many analysts single out those they most support or 
oppose. 
Table 1 illustrates their sweeping nature and focus on 
both supply and demand for labor, including scaling back 
early retirement options, improved active labor market policies 
to help the jobless fi  nd work, and reorganizations of national 
employment agencies. Th  eir comprehensive nature contrasts 
with many piecemeal crisis-induced labor market reforms in 
recent years in other euro area countries. 
Table 1 highlights how the higher employment rates for 
older workers seen in fi  gure 3 fl  ow from the labor market 
and retirement options newly available for this group. 
Unemployment benefi  ts were cut for German workers over 55 
and 58 years, while the minimum age for early retirement was 
raised from 60 to 63 years in 2006–08. Without the oppor-
tunity to retire at 60, German workers remained employed. 
Many analysts have argued that the fact that German wages 
rose more slowly than wages in many euro area countries 
after 1999 explains Germany’s recent economic resurgence.8 
Domestic wage restraint is cited as the reason for Germany’s 
regained competitiveness in the euro area, enabling it to take 
advantage of unit labor cost diff  erentials with other euro area 
countries and enjoy an export boom that has run up large 
current account surpluses. No doubt the German economy 
benefi  ted greatly from the boom in the rest of the euro area 
following the euro introduction, as many others have argued, 
and from the very high global growth rates in the years before 
the recent global fi  nancial crisis. In the early euro era the 
country’s increasing external surplus indeed contributed to the 
majority of German GDP growth.
But the euro area unit labor cost divergences can result 
from many diff   erent developments in both Germany and 
other countries. Figure 6, for example, shows how wage 
developments relative to Germany in the tradables sector vary 
widely between diff  erent euro area members. Only in Ireland 
and Spain, two housing-bubble countries with manufacturing 
7. Peter Hartz was a human resources director at Volkswagen (20 percent 
owned by the German state of Lower Saxony) and close personal advisor to 
Schröder during the eight years from 1990 to 1998 when he was the Lower 
Saxony state premier. Hartz resigned from Volkswagen in 2005 following a 
corporate scandal at the company. See “VW Executive Resigns as Scandal 
Spreads,” New York Times, July 9, 2005.
8. See, for instance, Whyte (2010).
sector wage growth higher than in other euro area members, 
do wage diff  erentials to Germany exceed about 10 percentage 
points. Meanwhile, Portuguese manufacturing wages have 
actually fallen dramatically relative to Germany since 1999, 
despite Portuguese real unit labor costs deteriorating by 
as much as 20 percent versus Germany by 2007.9 Limited 
German wage growth is thus far from the whole explanation 
for the euro area periphery’s uniformly higher labor costs. 
Th   e national hourly manufacturing wage data in fi  gure 6 
for 1999–2012 may have lost some validity, as German fi  rms 
acquired the legal option to opt out of nationally negotiated 
sectoral collective bargaining agreements during the 1990s. 
Consequently, actual German manufacturing wage modera-
tion during the euro years might be higher than refl  ected 
in the reported national data in fi  gure 6. Th  is arises from 
individual companies accepting more procyclical wages (i.e., 
lower wage growth in crisis times and higher wage growth in 
boom times) at the local level, ignoring national collective 
bargaining agreements. Assuming fi  rm-level wage fl  exibility 
has actually increased in Germany since the early 2000s, a 
similar development should be expected in other euro area 
peripheral countries. Th  ese peripheral countries have also 
recently allowed fi  rms to opt out of binding national collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Having experienced deep recent 
recessions, companies in Spain and Italy should consequently 
be expected to use their new-found—but unreported—wage 
fl  exibility and secure lower wage growth than what was called 
for by Spanish or Italian collective bargaining agreements. Any 
unreported actual German relative wage restraint in the early 
2000s beyond what is shown in fi  gure 6 should therefore be a 
temporary phenomenon, as peripheral fi  rms make full use of 
their new freedom to negotiate wages down during economic 
crises.
Wage costs, moreover, are only one component of total 
gross labor costs to which employer social contributions 
and other employer taxes must also be added. Even if wage 
levels are stagnant, such social contributions might go up. 
Social contributions and payroll taxes are typically paid as a 
percentage of wages, so the same nominal wage increase will 
increase total labor costs more in countries with higher levels 
of social contributions. Level diff  erences in overall labor cost 
will often also be of such a magnitude that a relatively short 
period of time of lower wage growth in one country—like in 
Germany after 1999—will not aff  ect the overall total labor 
cost diff  erentials between it and its trading partners. Figure 
7 illustrates this outcome for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
9. Data are from the European Commission’s annual macroeconomic 
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Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and the United States in 2000 and 
2012.
Figure 7 thus makes it clear that Germany’s reputation as 
a “low wage country” is without foundation. Germany had the 
highest total gross labor costs at the beginning of the euro era10 
among the included countries, and it still has the highest total 
gross labor costs by a signifi  cant margin. In fact fi  gure 7 shows 
that German total gross wage costs grew faster than in most 
of the other countries between 2000 and 2012.11 As a share 
of total German gross labor costs, French, Italian, Spanish, 
Greek, and American costs have all fallen since the introduc-
tion of the euro. 
Accordingly, while the German labor market has bene-
fi  ted from fortuitous external circumstances, the comprehen-
sive reforms implemented by Schröder are the major reason 
for its post-2005 resurgence. 
IV GERMAN JOB GROWTH HAS BEEN 
WIDESPREAD AND NOT JUST IN THE LOW-
WAGE SECTOR
Figures 1 and 2 showed how national German labor force 
participation and employment ratios increased since 2005, a 
trend that continued throughout the global economic crisis, 
despite a drop in GDP that was bigger in Germany than in the 
United States. Some attribute the rise in the ratios to an expan-
sion of low-wage jobs and a lack of traditional social protec-
tions.12 I argue that this analysis is based on fl  awed readings 
of German employment data. True, Germany does not (yet) 
have a statutory minimum wage, for historical reasons, partly 
10. OECD Taxing Wages statistics are only available on a comparable method-
ology from 2000 onwards.
11. Th   e seemingly counterintuitive result that Portuguese gross labor 
costs grew faster than in Germany—rising to 47 percent of Germany’s in 
2012—over this period, while fi  gure 6 showed manufacturing hourly rates 
declining relative to German wages, most likely originates in the very large 
wage increases in the Portuguese nontradables sector. Th   ese are included in the 
aggregate data in fi  gure 7 but not in the manufacturing sector data in fi  gure 6.
12. See, for instance, Adam Posen, “Germany is Being Crushed by Its Export 
Obsession,” Financial Times, September 3, 2013.
because of the tradition of social partners’ self-regulation and 
the postwar desire to decentralize the German economy. True 
also, low-wage jobs have expanded in Germany since 2005. 
But this trend represents a minor part of the German jobs 
miracle since 2005. 
Figure 8 shows that Germany has created more than 3 
million jobs with full social protections and contributions 
since 2005, a number exceeding the 2 million decline in the 
number of recorded German unemployed in the same period. 
In other words, since 2005, more than a million Germans 
have taken jobs after being previously inactive. Germany has 
thus not only brought down unemployment but also mate-
rially reduced inactivity levels through an expansion of fully 
socially insured jobs.
Some might note that this record came at the expense of 
German workers and occurred in the newly liberalized low end 
of the wage distribution (Hartz II in table 1). Some metrics 
do show that income inequality in Germany has increased in 
recent years and that the 22 percent share of Germans earning 
two-thirds or less of the national median gross hourly earnings 
is higher than in any other Western European euro member. 
But the same data13 show that in 2006 Germany had over 
20 percent of workers in the same group and with a median 
wage of more than €15 per hour—above the euro area median 
wage level. Th  e recent German labor market reforms have 
thus not led to an explosion in German inequality but rather 
a modest increase also witnessed in many other EU countries.
Figures 1 and 3 also make it clear that the recent positive 
German labor market developments and the modest increase 
in inequality have taken place amid a massive expansion of the 
total German employed labor force. Th   at trend is dramatically 
diff  erent from what occurred in the United States, for example. 
Many analysts might note that a large increase in job creation 
in return for only a very modest increase in inequality is a 
positive tradeoff   that other countries would happily embrace. 
To understand how the deregulation of Germany’s low-wage 
sector worked after 2003, one must look at the Hartz II round 
of labor market reforms (see table 1 for details). Th  e  following 
major changes were introduced into the German labor code 
concerning the low-wage or mini-jobs:14
1. Th  e monthly minimum income limit for mini-jobs was 
raised from €325 to €400,15 thereby increasing the income 
threshold for this type of job contract in Germany.
13. Eurostat Structure of Earnings Survey, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
statistics_explained/index.php/Earnings_statistics.
14. See Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2007) for details.
15. Raised to €450 per month in 2013. See Yasmin El-Shaif, “Geringfügig 
Beschäftigte: Minijobber Dürfen Künftig Mehr Verdienen” [“Low-wage 
Workers May Earn More in the Future”], Der Spiegel, June 7, 2012.
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2. Th   e employer is obligated to pay a 25 percent “fl  at tax” on 
top of gross wages (12 percent for pensions, 11 percent 
for healthcare, and 2 percent taxes) for a mini-job.
3.  For mini-jobs in private households, social contribu-
tions are only 12 percent (5 percent each in pensions and 
healthcare and 2 percent taxes).
4. Th   e ability to have a mini-job as a second job alongside a 
primary job with full social contributions was introduced.
5.  So-called midi-jobs with a monthly income limit between 
€400 and €800 were introduced.16
Th  ese changes have several important implications for 
understanding mini-job (e.g., German low-wage job) data. 
First, a mini-job entails a contract with a monthly income 
limit. But this type of job does not require clocking a certain 
number of hours to earn the statutory (now) €450 minimum. 
A worker might reach the minimum income threshold by 
working just a very few hours at a relatively high hourly wage. 
Second, only the employee is exempt from social security 
contributions, whereas the employer is not. Some social contri-
butions are therefore made for mini-jobs, though a worker can 
increase his/her income through a mini-job without having to 
pay any social charges. Th   is means that a worker faces a low 
marginal tax rate on mini-job income, giving the worker an 
incentive to increase working hours and add to take-home pay 
by taking a mini-job. Th   ird and crucially, German workers can 
now hold both a regular job and a mini-job without having to 
pay social contributions on the combined income. Th  is  means 
that a large increase in recorded mini-jobs does not necessarily 
imply an increase in “low income workers” in Germany. Th  e 
increase could in fact stem from an increase in the number of 
Germans with more than one job, of which one is a low-wage 
mini-job.
Figure 9 breaks the 7.5 million reported German low-
wage “mini-jobs” into their two constituent parts: “low wage 
only mini-jobs” and “mini-jobs as side jobs,” as this jobs 
category was created in 2003. Figure 9 also shows the develop-
ment in the main category of jobs with full social insurance. 
(Social contributions are paid by both the employer and the 
employee.) 
Most of the increase in the number of mini-jobs—from 
a little over 4 million in 2003 to 7.5 million today—is 
accounted for by the new category of mini-jobs as “side jobs,” 
or second jobs. More than 2.5 million such side jobs have 
been created in Germany since 2003, whereas the increase in 
stand-alone mini-jobs was only about 600,000 in the fi  rst 15 
16. Raised to €450 to €850 per month in 2013. See El-Shaif, “Geringfügig 
Beschäftigte.”
to 18 months after Hartz II was implemented in 2003. Th  us 
the apparent large headline increase in low-wage mini-jobs 
in Germany since 2003 is misleading, a “statistical mirage” 
attributed to the expansion in fl  exibility legislated with the 
Hartz II reforms.
Since the beginning of 2005, when more than 3 million 
jobs with full social insurance contributions were added in 
Germany, the number of stand-alone mini-jobs has been fl  at 
at under 5 million. Except for the early period of Hartz II’s 
operation, there is no evidence that liberalizing low-wage 
mini-jobs in Germany has come at the expense of job creation 
at higher wage and social security contribution levels. Indeed, 
the opposite is the case. Figure 9 is a strong reminder that in 
Germany all types of jobs have increased in recent years.
At the same time, the distribution of mini-jobs between 
stand-alone and side jobs is uneven across age groups. Figure 
10 shows that in 2013 half the mini-jobs among prime-age 
workers—the 25-to-54-year age group—are side jobs. Stand-
alone mini-jobs account for the majority of mini-jobs for both 
young and older workers.
Th  e young and the old in Germany are thus dispropor-
tionally prone to having a mini-job as their only source of 
wage income. But fi   gure 10 shows the number of prime-
age Germans with a mini-job as their only job has actually 
declined slightly from 2003 to 2013.17 Strong growth in fully 
insured jobs has enabled prime-age workers to transition from 
stand-alone mini-jobs to fully insured jobs; at the same time, 
these workers have also increasingly taken up mini-jobs as side 
jobs.
Th   e strong growth in mini-jobs as side jobs in Germany 
since 2003 is also probably related to German women increas-
ingly taking up part-time jobs with full social insurance. 
Figure 11 breaks down German jobs with full social insurance 
by working time and gender from 2005 to 2011Q2.
Figure 11 shows that more German men than women 
work full time. Job growth in this category from 2005Q2 to 
2011Q2 was somewhat evenly distributed among men (1.06 
17. Th   e overall decline in stand-alone mini-jobs for the 25-to-54-year age 
group from 2003Q2 to 2013Q1 is very small from 2.195 million to 2.187 
million.
The apparent large headline increase 
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million) and women (1.24 million). But whereas German 
men largely entered into additional full-time jobs (728,000), 
almost all German women started a new part-time job 
(972,000). Many German women employed part-time with 
full social insurance probably also hold a mini-job as side job.
When data in fi  gure 9 are broken down by gender in fi  gure 
12, they reveal a gender diff  erentiated impact of the 2003 mini-
jobs reform. Almost all the newly created mini-jobs for German 
women are in the mini-job as side job category (which more 
than doubled from 660,000 to 1.5 million), while the number 
of stand-alone female mini-jobbers has been basically stagnant 
since 2003. Meanwhile, among male German mini-jobbers, the 
increase is more evenly distributed, with two-thirds (~600,000) 
of new jobs in the mini-job as side job category and one-third 
(~300,000) in the stand-alone mini-job category. Th  e liberal-
ization of the mini-jobs category in 2003 thus seems to have 
helped Germans combine two jobs—one part-time (with full 
social insurance) and one mini-job.
Comparing the sectoral distribution of mini-jobs and 
regular full social insurance jobs in Germany (fi  gure  13) 
reveals that mini-jobs are disproportionally concentrated in 
traditional seasonal and high-labor-turnover sectors like agri-
culture, construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants, and household activities.18 Meanwhile, mini-jobs 
are less prevalent in traditionally higher-skilled and unionized 
sectors like manufacturing and healthcare.
Figure 13 further illustrates that mini-jobs have been 
modestly used in manufacturing, indicating a limited impact 
of mini-jobs on wage and unit labor costs in this important 
tradables sector.
Hartz II and the mini-jobs reform liberalized Germany’s 
low-wage workforce and spurred the growth of regular part-
time jobs in Germany. Th   e German labor market reforms are 
in some ways similar to other partial labor market reforms 
in the euro area, which liberalized conditions for women and 
young people. Th   e German labor reforms (table 1) did tighten 
conditions for older workers, while doing relatively little to 
increase fl  exibility among prime-age “insider workers” holding 
full-time jobs with full social contributions. Th   e risk therefore 
is that Germany’s labor market reforms have aggravated the 
“insider-outsider” labor market (those with secure jobs and 
those outside the labor force). Women, youth, and older 
workers (e.g., outsiders) in Germany now have better incen-
tives to take up jobs, but many of those jobs lack the employ-
ment protections enjoyed by prime-age men (insiders). Th  e 
increase in overall German labor market fl  exibility is therefore 
18. Th   e mini-job sectoral classifi  cation is based only on jobs for which sectoral 
specifi  cation is available. As a result, these data likely substantially underesti-
mate the prevalence of mini-jobs in private households in Germany.
concentrated only among some groups of workers. See box 1 
for the potential impact of the new federal minimum wage in 
Germany.
Th   e risk of aggravating the “insider-outsider” labor market 
is lessened because of the actual fl   exibility among German 
“insider” workers and short-time workers, or kurzarbeit.19 
Kurzarbeit is a German labor market tradition that encourages 
traditionally protected workers to work fewer hours during a 
crisis, while receiving temporary income support from the 
government. Th  e system enabled German aggregate labor 
utilization in 2009 to adjust to a 5 percentage point decline 
in German GDP without increasing unemployment. Th  ese 
wage supplements went to workers forced to accept fewer hours 
during the Great Recession, which did not last as long as feared. 
German exporters quickly returned to growth and the need for 
wage subsidies subsided. Many analysts regarded the system 
as a “one time wonder,” but kurzarbeit in 2009–10 was not 
without precedent. It was the latest historical example of the 
German economy’s insider workers adjusting to adverse shocks 
by absorbing the downturn across a large number of workers, 
avoiding mass layoff  s. Figure 14 shows the historical spikes in 
kurzarbeit benefi  t recipients in Germany since 1950 and high-
lights the strong historical procyclicality of kurzarbeit.20
Since the early period of the Wirtschaftswunder of German 
postwar reconstruction, the German economy has repeatedly 
experienced large temporary increases in kurzarbeit  benefi  t 
recipients. Th   is happened in 1967, after the oil price shocks of 
1973 and 1979,21 after reunifi  cation in 1990 in East Germany, 
and then again in 2009, when large layoff  s were averted.22 
Actual aggregate fl  exibility among German “insider workers” 
in a crisis is higher than what metrics focusing on individual 
job protection clauses suggest.23 Th   is is particularly the case in 
19. “Kurzarbeit workers” are defi  ned as employees who due to a temporary 
work outage of more than 10 percent of the employer’s total usual hours are 
placed on reduced individual hours, entitling them to receive partial unem-
ployment benefi  ts (kurzarbeitergeld). 
20. See Will (2010) for a detailed analysis showing the legal origin of kurzar-
beit in Germany going back to 1909.
21. Th   e annual average gross kurzarbeit recipient data shown in fi  gure 14 un-
derestimate the relative importance of kurzarbeit in earlier German recessions, 
when total West German employment was substantially lower than today.
22. Th   e relatively limited increase in kurzarbeit in the crisis/stagnation years of 
2002–03 is noteworthy and highlights that during this period, the slowdown 
in the German economy was not short-term and cyclical but rather structural 
in nature. Th   is consensus in Germany ultimately provided the foundation for 
Schröder’s Agenda 2010 reforms highlighted in table 1.
23. Th   e Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 
2013, chapter 2) lists Germany as having the most rigid employment protec-
tion legislation to protect permanent workers against individual and collective 
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Box 1     Potential impact of the new federal minimum wage in Germany
Germany has traditionally left wage-setting to social partners and therefore has no statutory minimum wage. As part of the 
recent grand coalition, the Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) accepted the proposal of the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) for a new German federal minimum wage of €8.50 a hour.1 
The impact of a new minimum wage will depend on how it is implemented. The SPD estimates that its proposal would affect 
about 6.8 million German workers earning less than €8.50 per hour, while the German wage distribution data from 2010 show 
that 21 percent of all employees earn less than the low-wage threshold of €10.26 per hour.2 
Figure B.1 uses the average weekly hours of German employees to estimate the monthly wage level of the SPD’s proposal. 
At 34.4 hours per week for four weeks a month, the SPD’s new minimum wage would be at the upper end of EU statutory 
minimum wages at around €1,170/month. That is about the level in the United Kingdom but below those in other continental 
economies like France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.3
The grand coalition agreement4 is vague on the precise rules that will govern Germany’s new minimum wage. According 
to the agreement, it would come into effect in 2015, though sectors covered by agreements among the social partners may 
be exempted until 2017. Moreover, the 12 sectors already covered by the Posted Workers Act (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz 
1. See the SPD website at www.spd.de/themen/102812/arbeit.html.
2. See DESTATIS (2012).
3. Like Germany, Denmark, Italy, Cyprus, Austria, Finland, and Sweden also do not have statutory minimum wages.
4. The agreement is available at www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf. 
Figure B.1     Statutory minimum wages in the European Union, 2013Q2, and estimated new German minimum wage
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations.
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manufacturing, where kurzarbeit programs were prevalent in 
2008–09.
By avoiding layoff  s in crises, employers also benefi  t by 
retaining their high-skilled workers, softening the adverse 
eff  ects of the country’s demographic decline and future worker 
scarcity. Th  e system also helps employers scale up produc-
tion again when a recovery begins. Kurzarbeit institutions 
are thus benefi  cial to a high-skilled manufacturing economy 
like Germany, which faces volatile external demand for its 
products.
Kurzarbeit labor market institutions have evident redistrib-
utive and inequality implications. Th  ey reduce cyclical layoff  s 
among insiders and work as an additional de facto “automatic 
stabilizer” providing direct and immediate income support for 
workers who remain on the job in a crisis. Moreover, the prac-
tice encourages German fi  rms to train their workers, as they face 
fewer risks of having to fi  re them in times of economic volatility.
But there is a downside to the benefi  ts of this system. 
Th  e highly prized fl  exibility it provides may inhibit creative 
destruction forces and the innovation that it encourages, 
freezing sectoral economic shares at their historic levels when 
change might be in order. Kurzarbeit’s subsidizing of insider 
employment enables too many companies (especially in 
manufacturing) to avoid necessary changes, impeding produc-
tivity growth and discouraging reallocation of resources to 
promote innovation and entry into faster growing sectors of 
the economy. Th   us the increased fl  exibility and advantageous 
human crisis impact of kurzarbeit institutions pose the adverse 
risk bias favoring high-skilled and successful incumbent fi  rms 
at the expense of new, fast growing, and entrepreneurial fi  rms. 
Box 1     Potential impact of the new federal minimum wage in Germany (continued)
[AEntG]) in federal German law will be permanently exempted. Several of these regulated sectors already have minimum 
wages of around €7.50 an hour in the former East Germany,5 making it likely that they will remain below the new €8.50 
minimum after 2017. In fact, the coalition agreement calls for an expansion of the coverage of the Workers Act to still other 
sectors of the economy.
A German sector falls under the AEntG’s jurisdiction if the social partners in the sector request that the federal Ministry of 
Labor and Social Services elevate their agreed wage and working conditions as “generally binding in their sector.” This is typi-
cally requested if a sector is subject to competition from foreign-owned firms not bound by the German collective bargaining 
agreements. Some sectors have also had a minimum wage dictated by the AEntG rescinded again.6 The federally mandated 
minimum wage under the AEntG amounts to a voluntary option for the social partners in a sector. Many more sectors will 
likely seek to come under its coverage if the partners feel that such a step is in their best interest. The €8.50 minimum is thus 
an optional minimum.
The new minimum wage will also be subject to regular review by a new commission of the social partners—who for 
decades have opposed a federal statutory minimum wage in Germany—with the power to adjust it “as required.” If the new 
minimum is found to damage job creation, it could be lowered again, notably in East Germany. The new German minimum 
wage therefore may not last very long at the agreed (by the politicians) €8.50 an hour level.
The German minimum wage would also have different effects in different sectors. It may not affect manufacturing at all 
because minimum wages agreed by the social partners in that sector already exceed €8.50 an hour. The new minimum wage 
therefore would likely have a negligible effect on German tradables unit labor cost. Instead the impact will be felt more 
strongly in traditionally high-labor-turnover sectors like hotels and restaurants and construction. At around €1,170 per month, 
the new minimum wage would seemingly outlaw the lower-wage mini-jobs at only €450 a month. Hence, it could potentially 
affect many hard-to-employ Germans working in mini-jobs. The new minimum wage is binding at the hourly wage level, 
however, and would not necessarily affect mini-jobs with few monthly hours. Nor is it clear how an hourly minimum wage 
would affect mini-jobs as side jobs. 
The overall economic effect of a carefully calibrated and gradually phased in minimum wage in Germany may therefore be 
relatively muted.
5. For instance, security services (Sicherheitsdienstleistungen) and indoor maintenance cleaning (Innen- und Unterhaltungsreinigungsarbeiten).
6. For instance, this is the case in mail delivery services and some mining and laundry services. NUMBER PB14-1  JANUARY 2014
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Th   e degree to which this is a desirable outcome involves 
broader societal choices outside the scope of this Policy 
Brief. But at the time of this writing—and paraphrasing only 
slightly—Germany’s practice of making BMWs as opposed to 
moving into high-speed fi  nancial derivatives trading hardly 
seems an outlandish public policy choice to make.
V CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT GRAND 
COALITION IN GERMANY
Th  is Policy Brief illustrated six basic points about recent 
German economic performance and showed how compre-
hensive structural reform can yield large economic and social 
benefi  ts. First, Germany has the best functioning labor market 
among large economies in Europe and the United States. 
Second, German wage restraint is of a relatively limited 
magnitude compared with most euro area countries and hence 
fails to explain the uniformly large intra–euro area unit labor 
cost divergences between Germany and other members after 
1999. Th  ird, total German labor costs per worker continue 
to exceed costs in other major EU countries and the United 
States. Fourth, Germany’s recent labor market revival has not 
come about through the expansion of predominantly low-
wage jobs. Fifth, the expansion of mini-jobs in Germany since 
2003 has overwhelmingly taken place as second jobs. And 
sixth, the successful reliance on kurzarbeit programs in 2009 
was not an innovation but rather another instance of labor 
input adjustment in favor of “insider workers” in Germany. 
Germany thus shows that countries can reform labor 
markets comprehensively and enjoy higher employment, 
higher labor force participation, higher productivity, and 
no increase in inequality beyond what other countries have 
experienced. Th  is is a powerful message to other European 
countries and even the United States, which languishes with 
an increasingly European looking labor market despite histori-
cally superior labor market performance than Europe. Other 
euro area countries should learn from the comprehensive 
nature of Germany’s reforms and their generally liberalizing 
direction, while Washington should take in how successful 
public policy supports active labor market programs and 
provides for worker retraining options.
Germany’s experience also provides an example of why 
short-term growth concerns need not justify delays in imple-
menting required reforms. Th   e outgoing German coalition of 
Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democrats and Christian Social 
Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democrats (FDP) evidently 
reaped the economic benefi  ts of Schröder’s earlier successful 
labor market reforms and was lucky that its overhaul of labor 
markets was carried out before the global fi  nancial crisis hit. 
But that does not mean that Germany’s recent labor market 
outperformance is a coincidence. Rather it highlights why 
the debate over the optimal business cycle timing of struc-
tural reforms is misguided and just how important it is for all 
countries—especially those in the euro area without short-run 
exchange rate fl  exibility—never to wait to implement neces-
sary structural reforms until the economy is improving or 
close to full employment. 
Schröder had no idea in early 2003, when he launched 
his Agenda 2010 domestic reforms,24 that they would shield 
Germany during a future economic slump or that such a 
severe slump would hit Germany in 2008–09. But his politi-
cally courageous decisions—his SPD party has not regained 
power in Germany since—provided Germany with economic 
resilience to withstand the recent very large economic shocks 
better than other large economies and better than Germany 
had in the past. Since no one can predict the future, it is always 
better to carry out required structural reforms without delay.
Lastly, there is much room for improvement in German 
domestic economic policy. At least two domestic labor market 
challenges are evident from the analysis:
1)  Continue to raise female labor input. Th   e successful Schröder 
labor market reforms leave room for further changes in 
German legislation to seek to increase the share of German 
women working full-time, as opposed to part-time and/
or in a mini-job. Th   e fact that full social contributions are 
payable once mini-job wages exceed €450 a month discour-
ages expansion of working hours.25 Another disincentive 
for many German women to shift to full-time work fl  ows 
from the increase in the marginal tax rate for two-earner 
households, as the German tax schedule’s application to 
the average income of both spouses makes it less advanta-
geous for many German women to shift to full-time work. 
Germany should make changes to its labor and tax laws 
to overcome these issues and give higher priority to child 
and elderly care to allow German women to increase their 
salaried working time outside the home.
2)  Avoid a dual labor market. Th  e Schröder reforms raised 
labor utilization by lowering the wages at which workers 
are willing to take up employment (reservation wages) 
and increased the availability of mini-jobs in the economy. 
Germany should now focus on helping workers trapped 
24. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografi  scher Bericht, 32. Sitzung, Berlin, 
Freitag, den 14. März 2003. [German Bundestag Stenographic Report, 32nd 
Plenary, Berlin, Friday, March 14, 2003], http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/
btp/15/15032.pdf.
25. Th   is is especially the case as healthcare is freely provided to mini-job hold-
ers in Germany, despite these jobs not being subject to employee healthcare 
contributions.NUMBER PB14-1  JANUARY 2014
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in quick-turnover, part-time, and low-wage employ-
ment by providing them with skill upgrading options 
so they can take permanent and higher-paid jobs. At the 
same time, the country should reduce the gap between 
well-protected regular jobs subject to full social security 
contributions and other types of employment by intro-
ducing more fl  exibility for “insiders” in higher-end work. 
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Table 1     Main featues of Germany’s labor market overhaul, 2002–10
Reform
Implementation 
date Main features Likely jobs market effect
Job-AQTIV 2002 Introduce individual quantitative profiling of 
jobseekers. More efficient use of active labor market 
policies.
Improved job search efficiency.
Hartz I January 2003 Enlist private firms to help jobless find work. Tighten 
conditions for acceptability of jobs and introduce 
sanctions for jobless person’s refusal of job offer. 
Liberalize temporary agency work.
Improved job search efficiency 
and enhanced incentives to take 
up employment.
Hartz II January 2003 Reform mini- and midi-jobs with limited social 
contributions. New subsidy for unemployed who 
become self-employed (Ich AG).
Raising incentives to take up 
employment.
Hartz III January 2004 Reorganize Federal Employment Agency towards 
more efficient servicing of jobless people. Simplify 
active and passive labor market policies.
Improved job search efficiency.
Hartz IV January 2005 Merge long-term unemployment assistance and 
social assistance into a (lower) means-tested 
unemployment benefit II.
Raising work incentives to 
welfare recipients by lowering 
reservation wages.
Cut in unemployment 
benefit duration
February 2006 Maximum benefit duration cut to 12 months (from 
26 months) for recipients up to 54 years and  
18 months (from 32 months) for recipients 55 and 
over.
Phasing out early  
retirement options
2006–10 Increase age threshold for early pension for 
unemployed (Altersrente wegen arbeitslosingkeit) 
from age 60 to 63 in 2006–08. Eliminate the 
option for unemployed over age 58 to receive 
unemployment benefits without actively searching 
fo work (58er Regelung). Eliminate subsidies for 
part-time employment for older worker new 
entrants (Altersteilzeit) after January 2010.
Increased work incentives for 
older workers.
Source: OECD (2012, 43).NUMBER PB14-1  JANUARY 2014
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